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Non-technical summaryAbstract
In this paper, we analyze the relation between interest rate tar-
gets and money supply in a (bubble-free) rational expectations
equilibrium of a standard cash-in-advance model. We examine
contingent monetary injections aimed to implement interest rate
sequences that satisfy interest rate target rules. An interest rate
target with a positive inﬂation feedback in general corresponds to
money growth rates rising with inﬂation. When prices are not
completely ﬂexible, this implies that a non-destabilizing money
supply cannot implement a forward-looking and active interest
rate rule. This principle also applies for an alternative model ver-
sion with an interest elastic money demand. The implementation
of a Taylor-rule then requires a money supply that leads to explo-
sive or oscillatory equilibrium sequences. In contrast, an inertial
interest rate target can be implemented by a non-destabilizing
money supply, even if the inﬂation feedback exceeds one, which is
often found in interest rate rule regressions.
JEL classiﬁcation: E52, E41, E32.
Keywords: Interest rate rules, contingent money supply, macro-
economic stability, policy equivalence, interest rate inertia.
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The stance of monetary policy is nowadays commonly summarized and announced in terms
of a target for a short-run nominal interest rate. Correspondingly, people pay less attention
to the behavior of monetary aggregates. The supply of reserves in open market operations,
nevertheless, serves as the main instrument of most central banks. The supply and the
demand for (narrow) money can thus be viewed to be “relevant only to the question of how
the central bank must adjust the instruments under its direct control so as to implement
its interest-rate operating targets” (Woodford, 2003, p. 106). Accordingly, the behavior
of monetary aggregates seems to be irrelevant for the analysis of optimal monetary policy
regimes, which are speciﬁed in terms of interest rate targets, as for example in form of Taylor-
rules.
This paper provides a theoretical analysis, which is aimed to disclose whether money sup-
ply is really negligible for macroeconomic eﬀects of monetary policy. The analysis, which is
conducted within the current "consensus" macroeconomic framework with frictionless ﬁnan-
cial markets, i.e., the New Keynesian model, takes a closer look at the supply of money that
is adjusted by the central bank in a state contingent way in order to implement a particular
interest rate target. There are several possible outcomes to which this analysis might lead.
One result, which would be consistent with the conventional view sketched above, would
show that any interest rate target can be implemented by a particular money supply in an
intuitive way. Thereby, a rise in the supply of money would be accompanied by a decline
in the interest rate, such that both instruments would indicate a monetary expansion. This
result is, however, not found in this paper.
Instead, the analysis in this paper leads to results which seem to be inconsistent with
the conventional view. Firstly, it is found that the relation between money supply and
interest rate targets is less intuitive. In particular, an increase in money supply is in general
associated with higher nominal interest rates. This result, which is due to the lack of a
liquidity eﬀect, implies that an expansionary money supply is accompanied by a change in
the interest rate, which looks like a contractionary monetary stance. However, the empirical
evidence on liquidity eﬀects is not unambiguous. Hence, the relation between money and
interest rate as revealed in the analysis is not necessarily counterfactual, though it is diﬀerent
than expected or described in most undergraduate macroeconomic textbooks. Secondly, it
turns out that highly stylized interest rate targets, in particular forward-looking Taylor-
rules that are designed to stabilize inﬂation, cannot be implemented by non-destabilizing
adjustments of the outstanding stock of money, i.e., by money supply procedures that for
example avoid hyperinﬂations.
At ﬁrst view, these results seem to challenge the conventional approach to monetary
policy analysis, given that these types of rules are widely applied in the literature. Yet,
the third main result in the paper qualiﬁe st h i sv i e w : A na c t i v ei n t e r e s tr a t et a r g e tc a n
be implemented by a stabilizing (and intuitive) money supply procedure only if the interest
rate target is suﬃciently inertial. Notably, the latter property, which is commonly found
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in the consensus macroeconomic framework. Thus, interest rate inertia might rather be an
implication of a stabilizing adjustments of the underlying instrument than an indicator for
an independent central bank preference in favor of smooth interest rate path. However, the
analysis shows that a particular money supply procedure is consistent with inﬁnitely many
inertial interest rate targets. Hence, standard macroeconomic theory predicts that stabilizing
money supply adjustments are consistent with interest rate targets as found in the data. Yet,
it cannot explain how one speciﬁc target is implemented.
Overall, the ﬁndings in this paper show that the theoretical relation between money
supply and interest rate targets is less intuitive than expected. On the one hand, the lack
of a strong liquidity eﬀect implies that an immediate rise in the interest rate in response to
higher inﬂation can only be brought about by an accommodating money supply. Further, it
is responsible for the central bank not to be able to implement an aggressive interest rate
target by a stabilizing money supply procedure, if the interest rate target is purely forward
looking. On the other hand, standard macroeconomic theory predicts that inertial interest
rate targets, which are consistent with empirical evidence, can be implemented by a non-
accommodating money supply, though in a non-unique way. These ﬁndings indicate that the
common assumption of frictionless ﬁnancial (money) markets hinders a full understanding
of monetary policy implementation. Nevertheless, this assumption, which facilitates the
macroeconomic analysis of monetary policy, can be viewed as a reasonable simpliﬁcation,
provided that it matters only for the impact of changes in money supply on interest rates.
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It is now standard practice to describe the stance of monetary policy in terms of a short-
run nominal interest rate. Correspondingly, it has become increasingly popular in recent
macroeconomic theory to characterize central bank behavior by targets for the (risk-free) one-
period nominal interest rate (see Woodford, 2003a). In many contributions to this literature
it is, in particular, assumed that monetary policy can be summarized by simple interest
rate feedback rules, such as the well-known Taylor (1993) rule. Notwithstanding, short-run
nominal interest rates serve as an operating target for most real world central banks, while the
supply of reserves, e.g., via transfers or open market operations, acts as the policy instrument
that implements certain interest rate targets: “In fact, of course, any particular interest rate
policy must be implemented by a speciﬁc money supply policy, and this monetary policy must
be implemented by a policy of ﬁscal transfers, open market operations, or both.” (Lucas, 2000,
p. 258). In accordance with this view, monetary policy might as well be described by a state
contingent money supply that implements a sequence of nominal interest rates satisfying a
particular target (rule).
The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we examine the structural relation between
money supply and interest rates in a dynamic general equilibrium model with inﬁnitely lived
households and frictionless ﬁnancial markets. Secondly, we derive characteristics of interest
rate targets that are implemented by money supply regimes in a rational expectations equilib-
rium. Thereby, we focus on fundamental (or bubble-free) equilibrium solutions, which satisfy
common equilibrium selection criteria (see Blanchard and Kahn, 1980, or McCallum, 1983,
1999). In contrast to related studies, we allow money supply to be contingent on endogenous
variables and, thus, depart from the common practice to restrict money growth rates to be
constant or exogenous. The latter approach is, for example, applied in Alvarez et al. (2002)
or Monnet and Weber (2001), where the equilibrium relation between money growth and in-
terest rates in a framework with segmented ﬁnancial markets and ﬂexible prices is examined.
This paper is further related to Minford et al. (2002) and Auray and Feve (2003), who assess
the observational equivalence between interest rate rules and exogenous money growth rules,
and to Vegh (2001), who identiﬁes basic equivalences between these rules in a continuous time
framework. Finally, our paper relates to the research on interest rate responses to money
growth shocks, which has revealed that unanticipated monetary injections tend rather to
raise than to lower the nominal interest rate, i.e., the so-called "liquidity puzzle" (see, e.g.,
Christiano et al., 1997).3
The main results derived in our benchmark model with a Lucas (1982)-type cash-in-
advance speciﬁcation can be summarized as follows. With frictionless ﬁnancial markets, the
consumption Euler equation essentially governs the equilibrium relation between the money
growth rate and the risk-free nominal interest rate. A higher nominal (real) interest rate
3This paper can further be viewed as complementary to comparisons of welfare eﬀects under interest rate
and exogenous money growth rules (see Honkapohja and Evans, 2003, Collard and Dellas, 2005, Gavin et al.,
2004, or Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004).
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characterized by a positive income elasticity. Hence, a nominal interest rate target that rises
with inﬂation (and output), is associated with money growth rates also rising with inﬂation
(and output). As long as prices are ﬂexible, forward-looking interest rate rules and state
contingent reaction functions for the money growth rate can further be equivalent, in the
sense that the fundamental solutions to the rational expectations equilibrium under both
policy descriptions are identical.
When prices are imperfectly ﬂexible, i.e., set in a staggered way, the initial price level
can be determined in equilibrium for any policy regime. This implies that a money growth
policy extends the state space, as it induces the equilibrium sequences to depend on the
initial stock of money, which is predetermined. Thus, an exact equivalence between the
latter policy regime and a forward-looking interest rate policy is obviously not possible. The
policy induced history dependence under money growth policy further implies that a non-
destabilizing money supply cannot implement equilibrium interest rate sequences that satisfy
a forward-looking target rule by which the nominal interest rate is raised by more than
one for one with inﬂation (active interest rate target). The reason is that the latter causes
the equilibrium condition for consumption to become unstable, which is associated with an
unique solution in a forward-looking environment, whereas it leads to divergent equilibrium
sequences under a money growth regime, since the history dependent evolution of money,
which is linked to consumption, becomes explosive. Notably, if the central bank is assumed
to be able to control end-of-period real balances without relying on cash injections, then the
implemented sequence of interest rates can satisfy an active target rule in a locally stable
equilibrium. Moreover, a forward-looking interest rate target rule can be equivalent to a
forward-looking rule for the real value of the end-of-period money stock that, actually, serves
as an alternative operating target, but not as a monetary policy instrument.4
To assess the robustness of the main results, we further consider an alternative money
demand speciﬁcation. In particular, we allow for money demand to be interest elastic and
for its income elasticity to deviate from one, by applying a money-in-the-utility function
speciﬁcation. The analysis of the equilibrium behavior of interest rates under sticky prices
reveals that state contingent adjustments of the money growth rate cannot implement a
Taylor(1993)-type interest rate target rule without causing equilibrium sequences to become
explosive or oscillatory. In contrast, an inertial interest rate target that exhibits a (short-
run or long-run) coeﬃcient on inﬂation that exceeds one can be implemented by a non-
destabilizing money supply, if the feedback coeﬃcient on the lagged interest rate in the target
rule is suﬃciently high. This ﬁnding suggests that signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on lagged interest
rates in interest rate rule regressions are rather a consequence of a history dependent money
supply, which implements the operating target, than an indicator for interest rate inertia
4Policy equivalance then requires end-of-period real balances to be independent of the real or nominal value
of the stock of money held by households at the beginning of the same period.
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known from the theoretical literature on monetary policy analyses that interest rate inertia
cannot be rationalized by a central bank aiming at maximizing the "true social objective"
(see, e.g., Woodford, 2003b), it is a property of the equilibrium sequence of interest rates
implemented by money supply adjustments.
The remainder is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop the benchmark model.
Section 3 examines the equilibrium relation between money supply and interest rates under
ﬂexible and sticky prices. In section 4 we examine an alternative money demand speciﬁcation,
i.e., the money-in-the-utility-function approach, and particularly focus on inertial interest rate
targets. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
This section presents a model with Lucas’ (1982) cash-in-advance speciﬁcation. To facilitate
comparisons with the voluminous literature on New Keynesian macroeconomics we allow
prices to be imperfectly ﬂexible due to a staggered price setting. The economy is further hit
by cost-push shocks, which are introduced via a stochastic wage mark-up. Throughout the
paper, nominal variables are denoted by upper-case letters, while real variables are denoted
by lower-case letters.
There is a continuum of households indexed with j ∈ [0,1]. Households have identical
asset endowments and identical preferences. Household j maximizes the expected sum of a




βtU (cjt,l jt), (1)
where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on the time 0 information set, and β ∈ (0,1)
is the subjective discount factor. The instantaneous utility U is assumed to be increasing
in consumption c, decreasing in working time l, strictly concave, twice continuously diﬀeren-
tiable, and to satisfy the usual Inada conditions. Instantaneous utility U is further assumed
to be separable in private consumption and working time, U (ct,l t)=u(cjt) − v(ljt).
At the beginning of period t household j is endowed with holdings of money Mjt−1
and a portfolio of state contingent claims on other households yielding a (random) payment
Zjt. Before the goods market opens, households enter the asset market, where they can
adjust their portfolio and receive government transfers. Let qt,t+1 denote the period t price
of one unit of currency in a particular state of period t +1normalized by the probability of
occurrence of that state, conditional on the information available in period t. Then, the price
of a random payoﬀ Zjt+1 in period t +1is given by Et[qt,t+1Zjt+1]. The households further
receive wage payments and dividends Dit from monopolistically competitive ﬁrms indexed
5See Rudebusch (2002) for a critical assessment of monetary policy inertia.
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where Pt denotes the aggregate price level, wjt the (individual) real wage rate, and τt a lump-
sum transfer. We further assume that households have to fulﬁll a no-Ponzi game condition,
limi→∞ Etqt,t+i(Mjt+i+Zjt+1+i) ≥ 0. After they leave the asset markets, households enter the
goods market, where they rely on liquid funds for transactions. In particular, consumption
expenditures are restricted by the following cash-in-advance constraint, which relates to the
speciﬁcation in Lucas (1982):
Ptcjt ≤ Mjt−1 + Zjt − Et[qt,t+1Zjt+1]+Ptτt. (3)
A c c o r d i n gt o( 3 ) ,t h ep a y o ﬀ from state contingent claims net of investments in a new portfolio
can be used for consumption purchases. Moreover, lump-sum transfers Ptτt which households
receive in the asset market raise the amount of liquid funds and, thus, alleviate the goods
market restriction. These injections serve as the central bank’s instrument to inﬂuence the
private sector.6
We assume that households monopolistically supply diﬀerentiated labor services. Dif-






jt dj. The elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated labor services ηt > 1 varies
exogenously over time (see below). Cost minimization then leads to the following demand






jt dj ,w h e r e
wt denotes aggregate real wage rate. Maximizing the objective (1), subject to the budget
constraint (2), the cash-in-advance constraint (3), the labor demand condition, and the no-
Ponzi-game condition, for given initial values Zj0 and Mj,−1 leads to the following ﬁrst order
conditions:











and the goods market constraint (3), ψt (Mt−1 + Zt − Et[qt,t+1Zt+1]+Ptτt − Ptct)=0and
ψt ≥ 0,w h e r eπ denotes the inﬂation rate (πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1), λ the shadow price of wealth, and ψ
the Lagrange multiplier on the cash constraint. Further, ξt ≡ ηt/(ηt−1) denotes the stochastic
wage mark-up, which will below be discussed in more detail. Furthermore, the budget con-
straint (2) holds with equality and the transversality condition, limi→∞ βt+iEt[λjt+i(Mjt+i+
Zjt+1+i)/Pt+i]=0 ,m u s tb es a t i s ﬁed. The one-period nominal interest rate on a risk-free
portfolio is deﬁned as follows
Rt =[ Etqt,t+1]
−1 . (5)
6Note that this speciﬁcation is equivalent to a speciﬁcation where open market operations — instead of
lump-sum monetary injections — serve as the monetary policy instrument (see below).
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2003a), we will consider the risk-free interest rate Rt as the central bank’s operating target.
The ﬁnal consumption good is an aggregate of diﬀerentiated goods produced by monop-
olistically competitive ﬁrms indexed with i ∈ [0,1]. The CES aggregator of diﬀerentiated








it di, with  >1,w h e r eyt is the number of units of the ﬁnal
good, yit the amount produced by ﬁrm i,a n d  the constant elasticity of substitution between
these diﬀerentiated goods. Let Pit and Pt denote the price of good i set by ﬁrm i and the






it di.A ﬁrm i produces good yi employing a technology which is linear
in the labor input: yit = lit,w h e r elt =
R 1
0 litdi. Hence, labor demand satisﬁes: mcit = wt,
where mcit = mct denotes real marginal costs.
We allow for a nominal rigidity in form of staggered price setting as developed by Calvo
(1983). Each period ﬁrms may reset their prices with the probability 1 − φ independently
of the time elapsed since the last price setting. The fraction φ ∈ [0,1) of ﬁrms are assumed
to adjust their previous period’s prices according to the simple rule Pit = πPit−1, where π
denotes the average inﬂation rate. Firms maximize their market value, which equals the
expected sum of discounted dividends Et
P∞
s=0 qt,t+sDit+s,w h e r eDit ≡ (Pit − Ptmct)yit.7
In each period a measure 1 − φ of randomly selected ﬁrms set new prices e Pit as the solution
to max h Pit Et
P∞
s=0 φsqt,t+s(πs e Pityit+s − Pt+smct+syit+s),s . t .yit+s =( πs e Pit)− P 
t+syt+s.T h e
ﬁrst order condition for the price of re-optimizing producers is for φ>0 given by
e Pit =
 











t+sπ(1− )s¤ . (6)
Aggregate output is given by yt =( P∗
t /Pt) lt,w h e r e(P∗
t )−  =
R 1
0 P− 
it di and thus (P∗





¢−  +( 1− φ)e P− 
t . If prices are ﬂexible, φ =0 , then the ﬁrst order condition for the
optimal price of the diﬀerentiated good reads: mct =  −1
  .
The central bank is assumed to trade with households in the asset markets. There, it also
injects money via lump sum transfers Ptτt. Its budget is thus given by Ptτt = Mt − Mt−1 =
(µt − 1)Mt−1,w h e r eµt denotes the gross money growth rate. It should be noted that we
can, alternatively, assume that money and government bonds are exclusively traded in open
market operations, where their supply is characterized by "holding ﬁscal policy constant in
the face of a government asset exchange", such that the government budget constraint can be
written as Mt−Mt−1 = −(Bt−Rt−1Bt−1),w i t hBt denoting government bonds (see Sargent
and Smith, 1987). Together with a consistent goods market constraint, which then reads
7It should be noted that the application of the households’ stochastic discount factor qt,t+s in principle
implies that dividends also deliver a liquidity value ψ, i.e., can be used for purchases of consumption goods.
We neglected this property to specify the cash-constraint in a conventional way. Nonetheless, the inclusion
of dividends on the right hand side of (3) would not (qualitatively) change any result in this paper, since
dividends are either constant (for φ =0 ) or — in equilibrium — solely a function of current output (for φ>0).
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We assume that the central bank controls the money growth rate µt = mtπt/mt−1 (where
m denotes real balances mt = Mt/Pt) contingent on the current information set. Thus,
money supply is speciﬁed as a function of the exogenous state or of endogenous variables







t eκµ,( 7 )
where µπ, µy,a n dµξ are arbitrary constants, and κµ is assumed to ensure that the average
value for the money growth rate satisﬁes µ ≥ 1. The reaction function (7) encompasses
money supply speciﬁcations which can typically be found in the literature, such as exogenous
money growth rules, µπ = µy =0 , or money growth rules that depend on changes in current
output or inﬂation, µξ =0 , (see, e.g., McCallum, 1999). The money supply speciﬁcation (7)
is related to rules for the interest rate target, which are also speciﬁed in a log-linear form.







t eκρ, with Rt ≥ 1. (8)
In the last part of our analysis, we further consider lagged values of the interest rate as a
determinant of the current interest rate target. It should be noted that the speciﬁcation (8)
is more general as for example Taylor(1993)-type rules, where a feedback from exogenous
states is usually neglected, ρξ =0 . We allow for ρξ > 0, as it might be a reasonable policy
when prices are ﬂexible. Note that the constant κρ can be chosen to ensure that the nominal
interest rate exceeds its lower bound, Rt > 1.
In equilibrium, households’ net wealth solely consists of money balances, since there is
no borrowing or lending between them, Zt =0 . The cash-in-advance constraint (3) therefore
reduces to Ptct ≤ Mt−1 + Ptτt. Using that all markets clear (including ct = yt)a n dt h e
budget constraint of the central bank, gives the following relation between money growth
and output Ptyt ≤ µtMt−1. The equilibrium is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium is a set of sequences {yt, lt, P∗
t , Pt, e Pt, mct,
wt,m t, Rt, µt}∞




1−  +( 1− φ) e P1− 
t , the households’ ﬁrst order conditions uc(yt)wt =
Rtvl(lt)ξt, uc(yt)/Pt = βRtEt [uc(yt+1)/Pt+1], Ptyt = µtmt−1Pt−1 for Rt > 1 and Ptyt ≤
µtmt−1Pt−1 for Rt =1 , µt = mtπt/mt−1, the aggregate resource constraint yt =( P∗
t /Pt) lt,
where (P∗




¢−  +( 1− φ)e P− 
t , a monetary policy satisfying (7) or (8), and the
transversality condition, for a given sequence {εt}∞
t=0, and initial values P−1 > 0, P∗
−1 > 0,
and m−1P−1 = M−1 > 0.
8The households’ budget constraint would then be given by Bjt + Mjt ≤ Rt−1Bjt−1 + Mjt−1 + Zjt −
Et[qt,t+1Zjt+1]+Ptwjtljt − Ptcjt +
U 1
0 Dj,itdi,a n dt h eﬁrst order condition on bond holdings by uc(cjt)=
βRtEt
uc(cjt+1)
πt+1 . A consistent initial value for total government liabilities would be equal to zero, Bj,−1 +
Mj,−1 =0 , which ensures government solvency in any stable equilibrium.
9In the last part of our analysis, we further consider lagged values of the interest rate as a determinant of










Ptcjt ≤ Mjt−1 + Zjt − Et[qt,t+1Zjt+1]+Rt−1Bjt−1 − Bjt,t h i ss p e c i ﬁcation is equivalent, i.e.,
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ρ
t−1 exp(εt),
where ρ ∈ [0,1) and ξ>1. Taking logs, one therefore obtains e ξt = ρe ξt−1 +( 1− ρ)ξ + εt,
where ξ>0 and e xt denotes the log of a generic variable xt, e xt =l o g ( xt),a n dx = E0e xt.
The innovations εt are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and a constant
variance, εt ∼ N(0,var e). The stochastic process can also be written as b ξt = ρb ξt−1 + εt,
where b ξt = e ξt−ξ. Throughout the paper, we further assume that the bounds on the mark-up
ﬂuctuations are suﬃciently tight, such that the central bank can ensure the nominal interest
rate to be larger than one, Rt > 1, and that the cash-in-advance constraint is binding.10
3 Money supply and interest rate targets
In this section, we examine the relation between money supply and interest rates in the
c a s h - i n - a d v a n c em o d e l . T ob em o r ep r e c i s e ,w e aim at disclosing the equilibrium behavior
of the risk-free nominal interest rate Rt under a state contingent money supply (7). We,
further, assess conditions for policy regimes to be equivalent. Thereby, we apply the following
deﬁnition of policy equivalence.
Deﬁnition 2 Two policy regimes are equivalent if they are consistent with the same funda-
mental solution to the rational expectations equilibrium.
Throughout the paper we focus on the model’s fundamental solution, also known as the
bubble-free solution, which satisﬁes commonly used equilibrium selection devices. For exam-
ple, the fundamental solution is identical with the unique stable solution (see Blanchard and
Kahn 1980), and it satisﬁes the minimum state variable criterion (see McCallum, 1983).11
It should be noted that we do not restrict our attention to policy rules that ensure the
rational expectations equilibrium to exhibit a unique solution. Nevertheless, we disregard
non-fundamental solutions, i.e., solutions with extraneous states.
3.1 Eﬃcient Interest Rate Targets
In the ﬁrst part of this section we consider the case where prices are perfectly ﬂexible
(φ =0 ).12 The wage mark-up leads to a macroeconomic distortion that accompanies the
cash distortion brought about by the goods market restriction (3). The latter distortion is
minimized by small values for the nominal interest rate, whereas a minimization of the former
distortion requires the central bank to stabilize the eﬀects from mark-up shocks. As a conse-
quence, the Friedman rule will not be optimal if the variance of e ξt is suﬃciently large. Thus,
an interest rate policy that stays away from the lower bound in order to undo the mark-up
10This can, for example, be induced by a suﬃciently high value for κρ in the interest rate target rule (8)
and a data generating process of the stochastic variable h ξt approximated by a ﬁnite state representation with
as u ﬃciently small support (see, e.g., Tauchen, 1986).
11See McCallum (2004) for the relation of these equilibrium selection devices.
12Under certainty, the Friedman rule (Rt =1 ) is, evidently, Pareto-optimal under ﬂexible prices. Then, the
cash-in-advance constraint is not binding, yt ≤ µtmt−1π
−1
t , such that the equilibrium allocation is consistent
with any money growth rate, that satisﬁes the transversality condition.
13
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target under ﬂexible prices satisﬁes e Rt = ρξe ξt + κρ,w h e r eρξ ≤ 0 and κρ ≥ 0.
When prices are imperfectly ﬂexible, which will be assumed in the subsequent section, an
eﬃcient policy regime should predominantly aim at stabilizing inﬂation, as shown in several
recent studies on optimal monetary policy (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003a, or Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe, 2004). Following Ravenna and Walsh’s (2005) welfare analysis in a model that
is (in reduced form) isomorphic to the model in this paper, it can further be shown that
an interest rate target under sticky prices and discretionary optimization takes the form
b Rt = ρπb πt,w h e r eρπ > 0 (see appendix 1.3). An optimal commitment policy is in general
history dependent if the private sector is forward-looking. To account for this property, we
will also consider the case where the current nominal interest rate is adjusted contingent on
changes in lagged output.
3.2 Policy equivalence under ﬂexible prices
For the case where prices are ﬂexible, we assume, for convenience, that the utility function






1+ϑ,a n dt h a t
σ>0 and ϑ>0. Combining the conditions, y−σ
t wt = Rtlϑ
t ξt, wt =  −1
  , and yt = lt,t h e
equilibrium can be summarized as follows: A rational expectations equilibrium of the ﬂexible
price model (φ =0 )with Rt > 1 and U = Uf is a set of sequences {πt, yt, mt, Rt, µt}∞
t=0
satisfying
(  − 1)/  = ξtRtyϑ+σ
t ,y −σ
t = βRtEt[y−σ
t+1/πt+1],y t = µtmt−1/πt, (9)
the transversality condition, limi→∞ βt+i ξ 
 −1Etm1+ϑ
t+i =0 , and a monetary policy either in
terms of Rt or µt = mtπt/mt−1, for a given sequence {ξt}∞
t=0, a given initial value M−1 > 0,
and any initial price level satisfying P−1 > 0. Reducing the model and taking logs leads to the
following linear equilibrium conditions in e mt =l o gmt, e Rt,a n de πt : e mt = −(ϑ + σ)
−1 e Rt −
(ϑ + σ)
−1e ξt+log(1−1/ ),a n d−σe mt = e Rt−σEt e mt+1−Ete πt+1+ 1
2vart (−σe mt+1 − e πt+1)+e β,
and a policy e Rt or e µt.
The question we want to answer is how money supply has to look like in order to lead to
identical equilibrium sequences as a feedback rule for the nominal interest rate. Given that the
model is suﬃciently simple, we do not restrict our attention to stationary equilibria.13 After
eliminating real balances, the model can be reduced to the following equilibrium condition














Given that output does not appear in the equilibrium condition (10), we focus — for simplicity
— on the case where the interest rate feedback rule (8) is only a function of the exogenous
13This approach is applied in the next section for a local approximation to the model when prices are
assumed to be imperfectly ﬂexible.
14
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 483
May 2005state and of current inﬂation, ρy =0 . Taking logs, the feedback rule (8) reads:




= ρπe πt + ρξe ξt + κρ, (11)
where κρ is a constant that ensures e Rt > 0. Given that there is no backward-looking ele-
ment, the fundamental solution does not feature an endogenous state variable. Eliminating
the nominal interest rate with (11) in (10), gives a stochastic diﬀerence equation in inﬂation.
The fundamental solution for inﬂa t i o nc a nt h e nb ed e r i v e di nas t r a i g h t f o r w a r dw a y ,b yu s i n g
the generic form e πt = γπee ξt+ψπ,w h e r eψπ collects terms that are independent of e ξt.I np a r -
ticular, the coeﬃcient γπe is given by γπe =[ ( ρ − 1)σ+(ϑ + ρσ)ρξ]/[ρ(σ + ϑ)−ρπ (ϑ + ρσ)].
In contrast to ψπ, which is given in appendix 1.1, the coeﬃcient γπe is independent of the mo-
ments of the exogenous state. It should further be noted that the existence of the fundamental
solution for inﬂation requires ρ>0 or ρπ > 0.14
Once the fundamental solution is derived, one can easily identify a money growth policy
which implements identical equilibrium sequences. For a money supply policy to be equivalent
to (11), the money growth rate has to be set contingent on the current state. In fact, we can
always ﬁnd a money growth reaction function of the form e µt = µπe πt + κµ or e µt = µξe ξt + κ∗
µ
that is equivalent to (11).15
Lemma 1 Consider the interest rate feedback rule (11). If ρ>0 or ρπ > 0,t h e r ee x i s t s
an equilibrium solution without endogenous states and inﬁnitely many money supply reaction
functions of the form e µt = µπe πt +µξe ξt +κµ that are equivalent. An equivalent money supply
reaction function satisfying e µt = µπe πt + κµ is uniquely determined and is characterized by
µπ =





ρ(σ + ϑ) − ρπ (ϑ + ρσ)
(ρ − 1)σ +( ϑ + ρσ)ρξ
, (12)
while κµ collects terms that are independent of the current state.
Proof. See appendix 1.2.
Further details on the term κµ are presented in appendix 1.2.16 Some notable implications
of the equivalence condition (12) should now be discussed. Consider the case where the
central bank aims to undo all mark-up shocks, which is a reasonable policy if the variance
vare is suﬃciently large (see appendix 1.3). In order to eliminate uncertainty, the interest
rate target (11) has to satisfy ρξ = −1 and ρπ =0 . Thus, (12) implies the response of
an equivalent money growth policy to inﬂation to be equal to one, µπ =1 , ∀t ≥ 1.T h e
supply of nominal balances then rises one for one with inﬂation, such that real balances grow
14The solution for real balances (and output) can, nevertheless, for ρπ =0be obtained from h mt = h yt =
−(1 + ρξ)(ϑ + σ)
−1h ξt +l o g ( 1− 1/ ).
15Evidently, a money growth policy h µt = µπh πt + κµ can be transformed to h µt = µξh ξt + κ
∗
µ,b yu s i n gt h e
fundamental inﬂation solution, i.e., both are equivalent for µξ = µπγπe and κ
∗
µ = µπψπ + κµ.
16For ρ =0and ρπ > 0, it can for example be written as κµ = ψπ
ρξ
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May 2005with a constant rate κµ : e µt+1 = e mt+1 + e πt+1 − e mt = e πt+1 + κµ ⇔ mt+1/mt = eκµ.N e x t ,
consider an endogenous interest rate rule, ρ
ξ =0and ρπ ≥ 0 that has often been applied in
theoretical studies (see, e.g., Benhabib et al., 2001, Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001, or Dupor,
2001). Equivalence then requires the following condition to be satisﬁed σµπ = ρπρ−1+σ−1.
According to this condition, an interest rate peg, ρξ = ρπ =0 ,i se q u i v a l e n tt oam o n e y
supply satisfying µπ = σ−1
σ and therefore implies money supply to be accommodating, i.e., to
be positively related to inﬂation, if σ>1.T h ei n ﬂation feedback of equivalent money supply
and interest rate reaction functions are further positively related. Some main implications
a r es u m m a r i z e di nt h ef o l l o w i n gp r o p o s i t i o n .
Proposition 1 Consider an interest rate rule (11) and a money supply policy satisfying
e µt = µπe πt + κµ.T h e n ,i.) an interest rate policy that eliminates uncertainty, ρξ = −1 and
ρπ =0 , is equivalent to a money growth policy satisfying µπ =1 ,a n dii.) an active interest
rate policy, ρπ > 1 and ρξ =0 , is equivalent to an accommodating money growth policy
µπ > 0. If households are risk averse or risk neutral, σ ≥ 1,t h e niii.) any interest rate
policy satisfying ρπ ≥ 0 and ρξ =0implies money supply to be accommodating, while iv.)
a constant money growth policy is equivalent to an interest rate policy with a non-positive
inﬂation feedback, ρπ ≤ 0 and ρξ =0 .
One main implication of proposition 1 is that when the central bank aims to raise its interest
rate target with inﬂation, then it has to increase the money growth rate with inﬂation, if
σ ≥ 1 (see iii.) Put diﬀerently, an interest rate target that might be meant to stabilize
inﬂation, ρπ > 0, is associated with an accommodating money supply, which is at odds
with the view that a central bank should reduce the supply of money when inﬂation is high
(see, e.g., McCallum, 1999). This relation between money growth rates and interest rates is
implied by the consumption Euler equation and the money demand speciﬁcation. It will be
shown in the subsequent sections that this main property will also emerge under sticky prices
or alternative money demand speciﬁcations with a positive output elasticity.
Regarding the issue of equilibrium solution multiplicity, it can immediately be shown that
if a money growth policy e µt = µπe πt +κµ satisﬁes σ−1
σ <µ π < 1 or 1+ 2
ϑ−σ <µ π and σ<ϑ ,
then the fundamental solution is the unique solution (see appendix 1.4). On the other hand,
an interest rate rule, e Rt = ρπe πt + κρ, ensures equilibrium determinacy if ρπ ∈ (1,1+ϑ
σ),o r
if ρπ > 1+ϑ






for ϑ<σ .17 Suppose, for example,
that the intertemporal elasticities of substitution for consumption and labor are equal to one,
σ = ϑ =1and that ρ =0 .75. Then, an interest rate rule ρπ =1 .5 is associated with a
uniquely determined equilibrium, i.e., the minimum state solution, which can equivalently be
implemented by a money supply satisfying e µt =2 e πt + κµ. The latter, however, allows for
multiple solutions to the rational expectations equilibrium. Hence, a policy equivalence does,
evidently, not imply these policies to be associated with the same determinacy properties.
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Turning to the sticky price case (φ>0), we focus on stationary equilibrium sequences and
apply a ﬁrst-order Taylor-expansion of the model at the steady state with a target inﬂation
rate π : π ≥ β. Hence, the model’s second moments are now irrelevant for the solution.
Monetary policy rules, which will only be applied in a log-linearized form, are assumed
to be consistent with the same steady state. The rational expectations equilibrium of the
log-linear model is deﬁned as follows: A rational expectations equilibrium of the log-linear
approximation to the model at the steady state with sticky prices (φ>0) and Rt > 1 is a
set of sequences {b πt, b mt, b yt, b Rt}∞
t=0 satisfying
σb yt =σEtb yt+1 − b Rt + Etb πt+1, (13)
b πt =βEtb πt+1 + ωb yt + χb Rt + χb ξt, (14)
b yt = b mt, (15)
where ω = χ(ϑ + σ), σ = −ucc(c)c/uc(c) > 0 and ϑ = vll(l)l/vl(l) > 0,a n dχ =( 1− φ)(1 −
βφ)/φ (see Yun, 1996), and the transversality condition, for a monetary policy in terms of b Rt
or b µt = b mt+b πt− b mt−1 given a sequence {b ξt}∞
t=0, and initial values for nominal balances M−1
and the price level P−1. The equilibrium conditions (13) and (14) diﬀer from the standard
New Keynesian model (see Clarida et al., 1999) just with regard to the gross nominal interest
rate entering the aggregate supply constraint (14). It should be noted that the main results
are qualitatively unchanged if one applies the more conventional speciﬁcation of the aggregate
supply constraint b πt = βb πt+1 + ωb yt.
3.3.1 Implementing interest rate targets
When prices are imperfectly ﬂexible, policy equivalence between a money supply reaction
function and an interest rate target rule are less likely, as will be shown below. We, therefore,
focus on the equilibrium relation between a state contingent money supply rule (7) and the
implemented sequence for the nominal interest rate. Thus, we examine how the central bank
has to supply money to implement a particular endogenous interest rate target.18 Thereby,
we assume that the latter takes the form b Rt = ρπb πt + ρyb yt, which relates for example to the
interest rate rule suggested by Taylor (1993). The model (13)-(15) is closed by the following
log-linearized version of the money supply reaction function (7)
b mt + b πt − b mt−1 = b µt = µπb πt + µyb yt + µξb ξt. (16)
The fundamental (minimum state) solution of the sticky price model under (16) turns out
to feature beginning-of-period real money b mt−1 as a relevant predetermined state variable.
The fundamental solution thus exhibits the generic form b mt = b yt = δm b mt−1 + δmeb ξt, b πt =
δπmb mt−1+δπeb ξt,a n db Rt = δRm b mt−1+δReb ξt,w h e r eδm i st h es i n g l ee i g e n v a l u e .T h ef o l l o w i n g
18A discussion of the vantages of endogenous interest rate rules (ρξ =0 ) can be found in Woodford (2003a).
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policy (16) and an interest rate policy.
Lemma 2 Consider the fundamental solution to the sequences {b πt, b mt, b yt, b Rt}∞
t=0 satisfying
(13)-(15), and a monetary policy.
1. Suppose that the money growth rate satisﬁes (16). Then, the equilibrium sequences of
inﬂation and output depend on beginning-of-period real money balances ∂b πt\∂ b mt−1 =
δπm 6=0if µπ 6=1and ∂b yt\∂ b mt−1 = δm 6=0 . The equilibrium sequences are locally
stable and non-oscillatory, δm ∈ (0,1),o n l yi fµπ < 1+κ1µy,w h e r eκ1 =
β+χ−1
ω .
2. Suppose that the risk-free nominal interest rate satisﬁes b Rt = ρπb πt + ρyb yt.T h e n ,t h e
equilibrium sequences are locally stable and unique if and only if ρπ > 1+κ1ρy for ϑ ≥ σ,
or ρπ ∈
¡
1+κ1ρy, κ2 + κ3ρy
¢
for ϑ<σ ,w h e r eκ2 =
2σ+ω+2σβ
χ(σ−ϑ) and κ3 =
1+β+χ
χ(σ−ϑ).
Proof. See appendix 2.1.
It should be noted that the condition in the ﬁrst part of lemma 2 does not ensure uniqueness
of the equilibrium sequences. It can be shown that there is only one positive and stable
eigenvalue, δm ∈ (0,1), if and only if µπ ∈ (e µ1π,e µ2π) or µπ < min{e µ1π,e µ2π,e µ3π} for σ<ϑor





−1, e µ2π =




κ3 (see appendix 2.1).
If the central bank controls the nominal interest rate — rather than the money growth rate
— contingent on b πt and b yt, then all endogenous variables are (under the fundamental solution)
solely a function of the exogenous state δm = δπm =0 . It should be noted that equilibrium
uniqueness, requires interest rates to be raised by more than one for one with inﬂation as
in a model without a cash-credit-distortion (see Woodford, 2001). The latter is however
responsible for the exact determinacy condition to be more severe than in the standard case.
As can be seen from the second part of lemma 2, a positive response to changes in output
ρy > 0, tends to raise the lower bound on the inﬂation coeﬃcient ρπ,g i v e nt h a tκ1 is likely
to be positive. In any case, an interest rate policy can, obviously, not lead to the identical
fundamental solution as the money growth policy (16). Next, we characterize the properties
of an endogenous interest rate target under a money supply (16).
Lemma 3 Consider a central bank that controls the supply of money according to (16).
Under the fundamental solution, there exists a unique value µ∗
ξ, such that the central bank
implements an equilibrium sequence of interest rates satisfying b Rt = ρπb πt + ρyb yt if µξ = µ∗
ξ.
This target rule for the nominal interest rate is characterized by
ρπ =[ σ(µπ − 1) + 1]δm and ρy = µyδm. (17)
Further, there exists no equivalent interest rate rule satisfying (8).
Proof. See appendix 2.2
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ξ can be found in appendix 2.2.19 Note that the condition for the response
of money supply to the exogenous state, µξ = µ∗
ξ, ensures that the nominal interest rate
target only depends on inﬂation and output. The feedback from the latter variables, which is
governed by the coeﬃcients ρπ and ρy,t h e nr e l i e so nt h ec o e ﬃcients µπ and µy in (16). The
equations in (17) reveal that the responses of money supply and the interest rate to changes
in inﬂation and output are positively related, if the equilibrium sequences are non-oscillatory,
δm > 0. The following proposition summarizes some main implications.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the central bank supplies money in a way that ensures the equi-
librium sequences to be locally stable. Then, i.) the central bank has to increase money supply
with output to implement an equilibrium sequence of interest rates satisfying b Rt = ρπb πt+ρyb yt
with ρy ≥ 0, ii.) an inﬂation feedback satisfying ρπ > 1 requires real balances to grow with
inﬂation, µπ > 1,a n diii.) an interest rate target satisfying ρπ > 1+κ1ρy for ϑ ≥ σ,o r
ρπ ∈
¡
1+κ1ρy, κ2 + κ3ρy
¢
for ϑ<σcannot be implemented.
Proof. T h ec l a i m sm a d ei ni.) and ii.) immediately follow from (17) in lemma 3, δm ∈ (0,1)
and σ>0.P a r tiii.) follows from part 2 of lemma 2, which implies that if the equilibrium
interest rate sequence satisﬁes ρπ > 1+κ1ρy for ϑ ≥ σ and ρπ ∈
¡
1+κ1ρy, κ2 + κ3ρy
¢
for ϑ ≤ σ, then there cannot be a stable eigenvalue, which is required for stable equilibrium
sequences under a money growth policy. ¥
The results on the relation between money supply and the interest rate target in part i.) and
ii.) of proposition 2 accord to the properties of equivalent policies under ﬂexible prices (see
proposition 1). Part iii.) of proposition 2 presents a novel result. A simple active interest
rate target satisfying ρπ > 1 and ρy =0(for ϑ ≥ σ), cannot be implemented by the central
bank if it supplies money according to a state contingent money growth rate (16). The reason
is that such an interest rate target requires the existence of two unstable eigenvalues, which
necessarily leads to explosive equilibrium sequences if there exists a relevant predetermined
state variable. Under a money growth policy, the supply of money and, therefore, consump-
tion depend on the beginning-of-period stock of money, such that the central bank induces
the economy to evolve in a history dependent way.20 Stability then requires the existence of
at least one stable eigenvalue which is inconsistent with the active interest rate target.
More generally, a forward-looking interest rate target that ensures the absence of stable
eigenvalues (see part 2 of lemma 2) leads to unstable equilibrium sequences if the central
bank aims to implement this target by a history dependent money supply. This result is
evidently not particular to interest rate targets that depend on current realizations of en-
dogenous variables. Given that the fundamental solution implies ∂Etb πt+1/∂b πt = δm,t h e
results summarized in proposition 2 also apply for an interest rate rule featuring expected
future inﬂation rates, b Rt = ρπEtb πt+1 + ρyb yt.
19For ρ =0it is for example given by µ
∗
ξ =( µπ − 1)χ[δm(β + χ + ϑχ − µy − ϑµπ +1 )+δ
2
m(σχ− χ − β +
βµy + χµy − σχµπ) − 1]
−1.
20It should be noted that this property relies on the fact that the equilibrium sequence of the price level
can be determined for all periods (nominal determinacy) if prices are imperfectly ﬂexible.
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which the central bank adjusts the particular interest rate target contingent on changes in
current inﬂation and current output. Under this restriction it has been shown that some
target rules cannot be implemented by a contingent money growth policy leading to stable
equilibrium sequences (see proposition 2). If one relaxes this restriction and considers interest
rate reaction functions, which feature the exogenous state variable, b Rt = ρπb πt +ρyb yt +ρξb ξt ,
there is a multiplicity of interest rate rules that are consistent with a money supply satisfying
(16).21 Thus, for this class of interest rate rules there is no simple relation between the money
supply behavior and the interest rate feedback coeﬃcients. Yet, this type of interest rate
reaction function is usually not used as a description of interest rate targets (see Woodford,
2003a). Further, the stochastic term can, evidently, not be interpreted as a policy shock.
3.3.2 Equivalence under alternative policy speciﬁcations
While the benchmark policy rule speciﬁcations cannot be equivalent under sticky prices, we
now brieﬂy examine alternative speciﬁcations of monetary policy that facilitate equivalences.
To assess the possibility of interest rate policy to be equivalent to a money supply reaction
function satisfying (16), we consider an alternative rule for the interest rate target, by which
the current interest rate is related to lagged output, b Rt = ρπb πt + ρlyb yt−1.22 Given that
b mt = b yt, we can easily derive a money growth reaction function, b µt = µπb πt + µyb yt,w h i c h
leads to a fundamental solution that is identical with the one under the backward-looking
interest rate rule. The following proposition presents the relation between equivalent policies
for the case where the autocorrelation of the mark-up shocks is assumed to be zero, for
convenience.
Proposition 3 Suppose that ρ =0 . Then, a backward-looking interest rate policy b Rt =








Proof. See appendix 2.3.
Hence, the main principle regarding the structural behavior of interest rates and money
growth rates also applies in this case: When interest rates rise with inﬂation, ρπ > 0,a n
equivalent money supply has to be accommodating, µπ > 1. According to proposition 3,
policy equivalence relies on ρly 6=0 . Regarding the issue of local stability it can be shown
that the backward-looking interest rate rule has to satisfy ρπ < 1+
β+χ−1
ω ρly for ρly ≥ 0
and β + χ>1, in order to be consistent with non-explosive and non-oscillatory equilibrium
21Using the fundamental solutions for output and inﬂation under (16), which take the form e mt = δm e mt−1+
δmee ξt and e πt = δπm e mt−1 + δπee ξt,w eg e tt h er e l a t i o ne yt =
δm
δπme πt +( δme −
δm
δπmδπe)e ξt. Thus, starting with
an interest rate target rule described in part two of lemma 2, there are inﬁnitely many equivalent equilibrium
relations of the form e Rt = ρπe πt + ρye yt + ρξe ξt.
22Such a history dependent interest rate policy, can for example serve as a characterization of a monetary
policy regime that aims to minimize a quadratic loss function, featuring inﬂation and output(gap) variances
as arguments, under commitment (see Woodford, 2003a).
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too aggressive (active) to implement stable equilibrium sequences.
We now demonstrate that policy equivalence can further be established if money supply
is speciﬁed in a non-backward-looking way. Suppose that the central bank aims to control
the real value of the end-of-period stock of money b mt. Given that monetary injections rather
than (end-of-period) real balances serve as the central bank instrument, this can be viewed
as an alternative operating target for the central bank. If it applies a forward-looking rule for
this target, such as b mt = ηπb πt+ηyb yt, then one can easily derive conditions for the equivalence
between such a real balance rule and a forward-looking interest rate rule.23
Proposition 4 Consider the target rule b mt = ηπb πt + ηyb yt for end-of-period real balances.
Then, there exists a continuum of equivalent interest rate rules of the form b Rt = ρπb πt +ρyb yt.
If ρπ =0or ρy =0 , then there exists a unique equivalent interest rate rule. For ρy =0 ,i t
satisﬁes ρπ = ρ − (1 − ρ)σηπ/(1 − ηy).










Etb πt+1 − σηπb πt. The fundamental
solution under the interest rate rule (and the real balance rule) reads b yt = δyeb ξt and b πt = δπeb ξt






ρ − σηπ](1 − ηy)−1b πt.T h u s ,o n e
can construct multiple equivalent interest rate rules of the form b Rt = ρπb πt + ρyb yt. ¥
Rearranging the condition given in proposition 4, ηπ =
1−ηy
1−ρ (ρπ − ρ)/σ, shows that an active
interest rate target rule ρπ > 1, is equivalent to a real balance target rule with a negative
feedback from inﬂation, ηπ < 0. The relation between these targets seems to be more
intuitive than the relation between interest rate targets and money growth rates described in
proposition 2. Evidently, there is a corresponding relation between end-of-period real balance
targets and state contingent money growth reaction functions.
It should further be noted that interest rate smoothing, where lagged values of the interest
rate are included in the policy rule (∂ b Rt/∂ b Rt−1 = ρr) does not facilitate equivalence. With
an o n - z e r oc o e ﬃcient on past interest rates, interest rate policy can certainly induce any
degree of history dependence. However, the policy rule parameters can, in general, not be
set in a way that reproduces the structural relations between inﬂation, real balances and the
interest rate implied by a money growth regime.24 The implementation of inertial interest
rate targets will subsequently be discussed in detail when money demand is interest elastic.
4 Interest elastic money demand
In this section we want to assess the robustness of the main results derived for the sticky price
case. For this we introduce an alternative money demand speciﬁcation that is widely used in
23Evidently, such a real balance rule is equivalent to a particular money growth rule satisfying e µt = µπe πt +
µye yt + µlye yt−1,w h e r eµly = −1, µπ = ηπ +1 ,a n dµy = ηy,g i v e nt h a te yt = e mt.
24The reason is that the fundamental solution now features the lagged nominal interest rate as the single
endogenous state variable, which implies that the remaining coeﬃcients of the fundamental solution are only
indirectly aﬀected via their impact on the eigenvalue δr ≡ e Rt/e Rt−1 (see Schabert, 2003).
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have preferences which are characterized by real balances entering the utility function. This
speciﬁcation can be rationalized as a short-cut for a more explicit speciﬁcation of money
demand, such as a shopping time speciﬁcation (see Brock, 1974). In particular, we apply
a speciﬁcation where end-of-period money holdings enter the utility function in a separable
way (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003a):
Um(ct,l t,M t/Pt)=U(ct,l t)+ν(Mt/Pt), (18)
where ν(mt) is strictly increasing, concave, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable. Log-
linearization of the households’ ﬁrst order conditions at a steady state with R>1 and a
positive elasticity of intertemporal substitution of money σm ≡− mνmm
νm > 0 leads to the
following money demand condition
σm b mt = σb ct −
¡
R − 1
¢−1 b Rt. (19)
Compared to the benchmark speciﬁcation, money demand, evidently, takes a more general
form under a money-in-the-utility function speciﬁcation, since it is now also interest rate
elastic and exhibits a consumption (income) elasticity that might be diﬀerent from one.
Due to the absence of the cash-constraint (3), the aggregate supply relation (14) now reads
b πt = βEtb πt+1 +ωb yt + χb ξt. The latter, the aggregate demand condition (13), money demand
(19), and a monetary policy then characterize the rational expectations equilibrium.
As in the former version, the fundamental solution of the model exhibits no endogenous
state variable for a non-backward-looking interest rate rule, while a money growth policy
induces the economy to evolve in a history dependent way. Thus, these policy regimes can
again not be equivalent. In this section we will explicitly consider interest rate targets to be
inertial, i.e., to satisfy
b Rt = ρR b Rt−1 + ρπb πt + ρyb yt. (20)
Introducing lagged interest rates as a relevant state variable does in general not facilitate an
equivalence. Yet, it will turn out that the previous results on the implementability of interest
rate targets are altered when the central bank’s interest rate target is suﬃciently inertial.
The novel results thereby rely on the property of money demand to be interest rate elastic.
The following lemma presents the stability and determinacy conditions for the equilibrium
sequences under both policy regimes. The results for interest rate policy correspond to those
in Woodford (2001, 2003a).
Lemma 4 Suppose that households’ preferences are given by (18) and that prices are imper-
fectly ﬂexible (φ>0).
1. When the money growth rate satisﬁes (16), there exists a stable and non-oscillatory
solution to the rational expectations equilibrium if and only if
µπ + κ4µy < 1. (21)
22
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2. When the risk-free interest rate satisﬁes (20), there exists a stable and uniquely deter-
mined solution to the rational expectations equilibrium if and only if
ρπ + κ4ρy > 1 − ρR. (22)
where κ4 =( 1− β)/ω > 0.
Proof. The proof of the ﬁrst part is given in appendix 3.1. A proof of the second part can
be found in Woodford (2003a).
It should be noted that there are also stable but oscillatory solutions if (21) is violated.25
Evidently, stability demands the monetary policy instrument not to rise too strongly with
inﬂation and output under a money growth regime, whereas local equilibrium uniqueness
for the latter interest rate rule requires exactly the opposite. Turning to the properties of
the implied interest rate equilibrium sequences under a money supply (16), we ﬁnd that
the relation derived in the previous section is qualitatively unaﬀected for a forward-looking
interest rate target rule. Yet, the fact that money demand is interest elastic changes the
relation for an inertial interest rate target rule (20). To implement this type of interest rate
targets, money supply has to be adjusted contingent on lagged states in the following way
b µt = µπb πt + µyb yt + µξb ξt + µlξb ξt−2. (23)
The history dependence of an (inertial) interest rate targets, thus, requires current money
supply to depend on past realizations of the exogenous state ξ. The following lemma sum-
marizes this result.
Lemma 5 Suppose that households’ preferences are given by (18), that prices are imperfectly
ﬂexible (φ>0), and that money supply satisﬁes (23). Under the fundamental solution, there
exist unique values for µ∗
ξ and for µ∗
lξ, such that the central bank can implement an interest
rate target (20) if µξ = µ∗
ξ and µlξ = µ∗
lξ. The equilibrium sequence of interest rates then
satisﬁes










lξ =0if ρR =0 .
Proof. See appendix 3.2.
Note that a (non-accommodating) money supply satisfying µπ+κ4µy < 1 implies δm ∈ (0,1)
and Γ < 1. Consider the case, where the interest rate target is not inertial (ρR =0 ), as in
the former section. According to lemma 4 and 5, a central bank can then not implement a
sequence of nominal interest rates satisfying an active interest rate target rule with ρπ ≥ 1
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ξ, µlξ = µ∗
lξ, and in particular µπ+κ4µy < 1,
which is necessary and suﬃcient for unique, non-oscillatory, and stable equilibrium sequences.
If, however, we allow for interest rate inertia ρR > 0, then the sign and the magnitude of the
coeﬃcients ρπ and ρy crucially depend on the exact feedback from lagged interest rates. If
the feedback is suﬃciently large such that ρR >δ m, then the interest rate sequence can be
consistent with ρπ + κ4ρy > 1 − ρR under µπ + κ4µy < 1.
Proposition 5 Suppose that households’ preferences are given by (18), that prices are im-
perfectly ﬂexible (φ>0), and that money supply satisﬁes (23), µξ = µ∗
ξ and µlξ = µ∗
lξ.T h e n ,
i.) the equilibrium interest rate sequence is consistent with inﬁnitely many interest rate targets
(20), ii.) an interest rate target satisfying (22), cannot be implemented by a non-destabilizing
money supply regime (21) if ρR =0 ,a n diii.) for ρR >δ m, the central bank can implement
any interest rate target characterized by ρπ ≥ 0 and ρy ≥ 0 in a stable and non-oscillatory
way.
Proof. Part i.) immediately follows from (24) indicating that there are just two conditions
for three unknowns. Part ii.) follows from the fact that there exists no stable eigenvalue
if ρπ + κ4ρy > 1 and ρR =0 . Hence, a money supply policy that aims to implement
such a target will necessarily be associated with unstable equilibrium sequences. Finally











R−1 , indicating that if ρR >δ m money supply satisﬁes µπ < 1 and µy < 0
for ρπ ≥ 0 and ρy ≥ 0,w h i l eδm ∈ (0,1). Thus, (21) is satisﬁed. ¥
A c c o r d i n gt op a r tii.) of proposition 5, an active forward-looking interest rate rule cannot
be implemented by a stabilizing money supply policy. This corresponds to the result for
the cash-in-advance model (see 2). Yet, considering inertial interest rate targets changes the
picture (see iii.). If the degree of interest rate inertia is suﬃciently high, ρR >δ m,w h i c hi sf o r
example ensured by values for ρR close to one, then a negative feedback of inﬂation (output) on
money supply is associated with a positive feedback of inﬂation (output) on the interest rate
target (see 24). Hence, the central bank can for ρR >δ m implement an equilibrium sequence
of interest rates consistent with positive elasticities ρπ and ρy by an appropriate choice of the
money supply response coeﬃcient µπ, without inducing the equilibrium sequences to become
explosive. For ρR >δ m, a stabilizing money supply regime is therefore consistent with (long-




/(1 − ρR) > 1, which have been found in interest
rate rule regressions (see, e.g., Clarida et al., 2000, for the pre-1979 period).26
A si m p l i e db yp a r ti.) of proposition 5, the exact values for the coeﬃcients of the inter-
est rate target rule ρR, ρπ,a n dρy are not uniquely determined under a particular money
growth reaction function (23). Thus, for any given contingent money growth policy, there
are inﬁnitely many representations of an inertial interest rate target rule. If, for example,
one restricts the interest rate target to satisfy ρR =1 , such that the target rule is speciﬁed
26If however ρR <δ m, an implementation of an interest rate target (20) with ρπ +κ4ρy > 1 requires money
supply to violate (21), which leads to unstable or oscillatory equilibrium sequences.
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contingent money supply adjustments. Moreover, such an interest rate target with feedback
coeﬃcients ρπ ≥ 0 and ρy ≥ 0 is associated with a stable equilibrium, and is consistent with
the empirical evidence by Ireland (2004), who estimated an interest rate rule in terms of
growth rates and found positive feedback coeﬃcients on current inﬂation and the output gap.
5C o n c l u s i o n
When a short-run nominal interest rate serves as the operating target, the central bank has
to adjust the stock of money in a state contingent way, in order to implement a particular
feedback rule for its interest rate target. In this paper an analysis of the relation between
money supply and interest rate targets is conducted in a general equilibrium model with stan-
dard money demand speciﬁcations and frictionless ﬁnancial markets. The implementation
of simple interest rate targets that rise with inﬂation (and output), is shown to require the
accompanying money growth rates also to rise with inﬂation (and output). When prices are
imperfectly ﬂexible, such an accommodating money supply tends to destabilize equilibrium
sequences if the interest rate target rule is forward-looking and active, such as the Taylor
(1993) rule. In contrast, a suﬃciently inertial interest rate target can be implemented by a
stabilizing money supply policy, even if the (long-run) inﬂation feedback exceeds one. Thus,
when econometricians ﬁnd signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on lagged interest rates in interest rate re-
gressions, this might rather originate in a non-destabilizing adjustment of the outstanding
stock of money, than being an indication for inertia as a fundamental component of the mon-
etary strategy. Yet, the coeﬃcients of an inertial interest rate target rule are not uniquely
identiﬁed under a particular money supply regime. We view these ﬁndings as an indication
that the assumption of frictionless ﬁnancial (money) market is less useful for a full under-
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1 Appendix to the ﬂexible price model
1.1 Fundamental solution
The model under ﬂexible prices can be reduced to (10). Eliminating the nominal interest
rate with the policy rule (11) gives
0=[ σρπ − (ϑ + σ)]Ete πt+1 + σρξEtξt+1 − σ(1 − ρ)e ξt +( ϑ + σ)
³
e β + κρ
´

















+ ϑρπe πt + ϑρξξt.
Evidently, there is no endogenous state variable, such that the fundamental solution for
inﬂation takes the form e πt = γπee ξt + ψπ,i m p l y i n gEte πt+1 = ρe πt +( 1− ρ)π.T h u s ,w eg e t
e πt =
(ρ − 1)σ +( ϑ + ρσ)ρξ
ρ(σ + ϑ) − ρπ (ϑ + ρσ)
e ξt
+




(1 − ρ)ξ +( σ + ϑ)κρ +( ϑ + σ)e β
ρσ + ρϑ − ϑρπ − ρσρπ
+
ϑ + σ





















The solution for e πt can be summarized by the following term which governs the impact of
the current state e ξt on inﬂation
γπe =
(ρ − 1)σ +( ϑ + ρσ)ρξ
ρ(σ + ϑ) − ρπ (ϑ + ρσ)
,
and by ψπ which collects the remaining terms that are independent of the current state.





σρπ − σ + ϑρξ
¢2
(1 − ρπ)(ρσ + ρϑ − ϑρπ − ρσρπ)





ξ − e β − κρ
´
− σξ − ϑκρ − e βϑ
´
+ ρξξϑ(ρ − 1) + ρ
³







(ρπ − 1)(ϑρπ − ρϑ − ρσ + ρσρπ)
,
where Ξ summarizes terms of higher order than two. It should be noted that these terms
vanish if shocks are not autocorrelated, ρ =0 . For example, when ρ =0and ρπ > 0,t h e
solution for inﬂation is given by e πt = γπee ξt + ψπ,w h e r e
γπe =
σ − ϑρξ
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We want to derive a money growth policy that is equivalent to (11). For this we combine the
equilibrium condition −σe mt = e Rt −σEt e mt+1 −Ete πt+1 + 1
2vart (−σe mt+1 − e πt+1)+e β and the
interest rate feedback rule (11) to give
σEt e mt+1 − σe mt = ρξe ξt + ρπe πt + κρ − Ete πt+1 +
1
2
vart (−σe mt+1 − e πt+1)+e β.
Further using Ete πt+1 = ρe πt +( 1− ρ)π, the money growth rate e µt = e mt + e πt − e mt−1,a n d
Ete µt+1 = ρe µt +( 1− ρ)µ,w eg e t
σρe µt+σ(1 − ρ)µ = ρξe ξt+(ρπ +( σ − 1)ρ)e πt+
1
2
vart (−σe mt+1 − e πt+1)+e β+κρ+(σ − 1)(1 − ρ)π.
Together with the inﬂation solution, we can therefore derive an equivalent money growth
policy either as a function of the exogenous state e µt = e µt(e ξt) or as a function of an endogenous




























vart (−σe mt+1 − e πt+1).




+ κµ,w ec a nw r i t et h et e r m
κµ, which collects terms in the money supply reaction function e µt = µπe πt + κµ that are
independent of inﬂation, as
κµ =−(σρ− 1)ρξψπ (γπe)
−1 +( σρ− 1)
³







vart (−σe mt+1 − e πt+1).
The last term can be decomposed into a variance term and Ξ collecting terms of higher
order (σρ− 1) 1
2vart (−σe mt+1 − e πt+1)=( σρ− 1)(
σ−σρπ−ϑρξ
ρσ+ρϑ−ϑρπ−ρσρπ)2 1
2vare+Ξ.T h el a s tt e r m
vanishes for ρ =0 .T o g i v e a n e x a m p l e , f o r ρ =0and ρπ > 0 the policy parameter κµ is
given by κµ = ψπ
ρξ
γeπ −κρ+(σ − σµπ − 1)(−ψπ − γeπ)−(
σ−σρπ−ϑρξ
ρσ+ρϑ−ϑρπ−ρσρπ)2 1
2vare,w h e r et h e
coeﬃcients of the inﬂation solution ψπ and γeπ can be found in (25). ¥
1.3 Eﬃciency of interest rate targets
Flexible prices The following discussion is aimed to demonstrate the welfare implications
of a state contingent interest rate rule (11) for ρπ =0 , which encompasses the Friedman rule
for κρ = ρξ =0 . Suppose, for simplicity, that shocks are not autocorrelated, ρ =0 ,s u c h
that e ξt = ξ + εt. Inserting the interest rate rule, e Rt = ρξe ξt + κρ, into the static equilibrium
condition in (9), gives e ct = −(ϑ + σ)
−1
³
κρ + ρξe ξt
´
− (ϑ + σ)
−1e ξt +l o g ( 1− 1/ ). Hence,
the solution for consumption is given by e ct = −
1+ρξ
ϑ+σ
e ξt +l o g ( 1− 1/ ) − (ϑ + σ)−1κρ.I n
what follows we compare the implications of interest rate policy on households’ welfare. In
27
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that eliminates consumption ﬂuctuations induced by aggregate shocks, ρξ = −1.T h ef o r m e r





e ξt +l o g ( 1− 1/ ),
and, therefore, cF = − 1
ϑ+σξ +l o g ( 1− 1/ ) and var(e cF
t )=( ϑ + σ)2vare, while the state
contingent policy is associated with a constant consumption value given by
e cS
t = c =l o g ( 1− 1/ ) − (ϑ + σ)
−1 κρ,
and, therefore, var(e cS
t )=0 . Correspondingly, the equilibrium sequences for working time
satisfy e lF
t = − 1
ϑ+σ
e ξt +log(1− 1/ ) and e lS
t =l o g ( 1− 1/ ) − (ϑ + σ)
−1 κρ, respectively. Given
that the model exhibits no endogenous state variable, the maximization problem of the
households is entirely static. Hence, the households’ objective (1) reduces to maxE0ut =
(1 − σ)−1E0c1−σ
t − (1 + ϑ)
−1 E0l1+ϑ
t . Using that all variables are log-normally distributed,
the problem can be written as
maxE0ut =( 1− σ)−1e(1−σ)c+(1/2)(1−σ)2varc − (1 + ϑ)
−1 e(1+ϑ)l+(1/2)(1+ϑ)2varl. (26)
Now, consider the Friedman rule. Inserting the solution for consumption and working time
in the expression for expected utility (26), gives the following value
(E0ut)





−1 ξ +l o g ( 1− 1/ )
´
+( 1 /2)(1 − σ)








−1 ξ +l o g ( 1− 1/ )
´
+( 1 /2)(1 + ϑ)
2 (ϑ + σ)2vare
i
.
It can immediately be seen that expected utility (E0ut)
F declines monotonically with the
variance of mark-up shocks, varε, if (but not only if) σ ≥ 1. Under the state contingent
policy ρξ = −1, expected utility is given by
(E0ut)
















When σ ≥ ϑ +2 , expected utility (E0ut)
S declines with the average value for the nominal
interest rate κρ : ∂ (E0ut)
S /∂κρ < 0. Nevertheless, the central bank can raise expected
utility by switching from the Friedman rule to a state contingent rule satisfying ρξ = −1,i f
the variance varε is suﬃciently large.
Sticky prices As shown by Ravenna and Walsh (2005), household welfare of an isomorphic
model can be approximated by applying a second-order Taylor expansion at the (undistorted)
28
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 483




















Applying this objective and the equilibrium conditions, which are log-linearized at the steady
state, as constraints, the policy problem under discretionary optimization leads to the fol-
lowing ﬁrst order condition b πt = −σ+ϑ
 ϑ b yt. This condition deviates from the condition of
the corresponding cashless model, which reads b πt = −1
 b yt (see Woodford, 2003a). Apply-
ing the log-linearized consumption Euler equation σb ct = σEtb ct+1 − b Rt + Etb πt+1,w h e r e
σ = −ucc(c)c/uc(c) > 0 and using b yt = b ct, we get the following equilibrium relation for








where ϑ = vll(l)l/vl(l) > 0 we used that Etb πt+1 = ρb πt and Etb yt+1 = ρb yt. Thus, the term in
the round bracket is strictly positive and can be smaller or larger than one.
1.4 Equilibrium solution uniqueness of the ﬂexible price model
To assess the conditions for equilibrium solution uniqueness we apply the deterministic ver-
sion, for convenience. We start with t h ec a s eo fam o n e yg r o w t hp o l i c ye µt = µπe πt + κµ.
Replacing the nominal interest rate and consumption, the equilibrium conditions can be re-
duced to σe mt+1 = −ϑe mt − e πt+1 + e β + g  −1
  . Combining the latter with the logged money
growth reaction function for the period t +1 , leads to the following diﬀerence equation in
real balances
e mt+1 = {(1 − µπ)(σ + ϑ)/[1 + σ (µπ − 1)]}e mt +  , (27)
and where   collects constant terms. Given that the diﬀerence equation is forward looking,
uniqueness requires the eigenvalue of (27) to be unstable, i.e., to lie outside the unit circle.
Using that the term in the curly brackets is strictly larger than one if σ−1
σ <µ π < 1,a n d
smaller than −1 if σ<ϑand 1+ 2
ϑ−σ <µ π, the equilibrium is uniquely determined if and
only if σ−1
σ <µ π < 1 or 1+ 2
ϑ−σ <µ π for σ<ϑ .
Next, consider the case where monetary policy follows an interest rate rule e Rt = ρπe πt+κρ.
Then the structural part of (10) reads
e πt+1 = −
ϑρπ
(σρπ − (ϑ + σ))
e πt +  ∗.




¯ ¯ ¯ > 1. Suppose
that ϑ + σ>σ ρ π,t h e n−
ϑρπ
σρπ−(ϑ+σ) > 1 if ρπ > 1.F o r ϑ + σ<σ ρ π,w eh a v et oc h e c ki n
this case if −
ϑρπ
σρπ−(ϑ+σ) < −1. For this, we have to distinguish the cases where ϑ ≥ σ and
ϑ<σ .I fϑ ≥ σ it follows immediately that
ϑρπ
−σρπ+ϑ+σ < −1. Hence, determinacy also arises if
ρπ > 1+ϑ
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σ),o rρπ > 1+ϑ







2 Appendix to the sticky price model
2.1 Proof of lemma 2
To establish the claim made in the ﬁrst part of the lemma, we apply the equilibrium con-
ditions (13)-(14) together with an interest rate "rule " b Rt = ρπb πt + ρyb yt,w h e r eρπ ≥ 0 and










ρπ σ + ρy














The characteristic polynomial of this system is given by
M(X)=X2 + X
σχρπ − ω − σβ − βρy − χρy − σ
βσ
+
σ + ρy + ωρπ − σχρπ
βσ
.
Equilibrium uniqueness requires both eigenvalues to be unstable. To derive the conditions
for this we ﬁrstly consider M(0) =
σ+ρy+ϑχρπ
σβ > 1, where use that ω = σχ+ϑχ. Thus, there
exists at least one unstable eigenvalue. Next, we examine M(X) at X =1 ,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y
M(1) =
£
ω(1 − ρπ)+( β + χ − 1)ρy
¤
/(βσ),
implying that M(1) < 0 ⇔ ρπ > 1+
β+χ−1
ω ρy. Then, the existence of a stable eigenvalue can
be ruled out, if M(X) at X = −1,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y
M(−1) =
£
2σ + ω +2 σβ +( 1+β + χ)ρy − χ(σ − ϑ)ρπ
¤
/(βσ),




χ(σ−ϑ) ρy for ϑ<σ .
Hence, equilibrium sequences satisfying b Rt = ρπb πt+ρyb yt are uniquely determined if and only
if ρπ > 1+
β+χ−1











T u r n i n gt ot h esecond part of the lemma, we eliminate the nominal interest rate in the
equilibrium conditions (13) and (15), and use b yt = b mt, leading — together with the money
supply rule — to the following set of equilibrium conditions




b mt − b mt−1 =(µπ − 1)b πt + µξb ξt. (29)
Given that the predetermined value of beginning-of-period real balances enters the set of
equilibrium conditions, the generic form for the fundamental solution reads
b mt = δm b mt−1 + δmeb ξt, b πt = δπmb mt−1 + δπeb ξt. (30)
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0=δm (β + χ)δπm − δπm + σχδ2





δm − 1 − (µπ − 1)δπm, (32)





δme +( µπ − 1)δπe + µξ. (34)
We now use the conditions (31)-(32) to examine the eigenvalues of the model. Suppose that
µπ =1 . Then, the eigenvalue δm is given by δm = 1
1−µy. O t h e r w i s e ,w eh a v et oc h e c kt h e
roots of the following quadratic (characteristic) polynomial
G(X)=X2+X
(µπ − 1)ω − χ − β − (µπ − 1)σχ+ µy − 1









Given that the model exhibits one predetermined variable, we want to establish the existence
of a stable eigenvalue. For this, we examine the value of G at X =0 ,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y
G(0) =
£










. Then the model exhibits a
stable root if G(1),w h i c hi sg i v e nb y
G(1) =
µy (1 − β − χ)+ω(µπ − 1)




is positive, G(1) > 0.T h i s ,o b v i o u s l yr e q u i r e sµπ < 1+
µy(β+χ−1)
ω ,w h i c hi sa s s u m e dt ob e
satisﬁed in what follows. To ensure that there is a single stable root, G(−1),w h i c hi sg i v e n
by
G(−1) = −








has to be negative, G(−1) < 0. To disclose the conditions for this, we have to distinguish the
cases σ>ϑand σ<ϑ . Suppose that σ>ϑ⇔ 2σχ − ω>0. Then, we can conclude that






. Now suppose that σ<ϑ⇔ 2σχ − ω<0. Then,













. Then, the existence of a stable root again requires µπ < 1+
µy(β+χ−1)
ω .I n
this case there cannot be another stable root. Hence, the model exhibits a unique stable and
positive eigenvalue if and only if
i) µπ ∈ (e µ1π,e µ2π), or
ii) µπ < min{e µ1π,e µ2π,e µ3π} for σ<ϑ
e µ3π <µ π < min{e µ1π,e µ2π} for σ>ϑ ,
where e µ1π =1+
(β+χ)(µy−1)
σχ , e µ2π =1+
µy(β+χ−1)
ω ,a n de µ3π =1+
(β+χ+1)(µy−2)
2σχ−ω ,w h i l et h e
Inserting the latter solution in (28)-(29), leads to the following conditions for the undeter-
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2.2 Proof of lemma 3
To assess the equilibrium behavior of the nominal interest rate under the money growth
regime (16),27 we use the equilibrium conditions (13) and b yt = b mt to get σEt b mt+1 − σb mt =
b Rt − Etb πt+1, which can be rewritten in terms of the expected money growth rate
σEtb µt+1 = b Rt +( σ − 1)Etb πt+1.
Using the state contingent money growth reaction function b mt + b πt − b mt−1 = µπb πt + µyb yt +
µξb ξt = µπb πt + µy b mt + µξb ξt, we obtain the following relation between, the current nominal
interest rate and the expected future values for inﬂation and real balances and the cost push
shock
b Rt =( −(σ − 1) + σµπ)Etb πt+1 + µyEt b mt+1 + µξρb ξt,
where we used that Etb ξt+1 = ρb ξt. In order to rewrite this equilibrium relation in terms of
current realizations of the endogenous variables we use the solution for real balances b mt =
δmb mt−1+δmeb ξt and that Etb πt+1 = Et
³
δπmb mt + δπeb ξt+1
´
= δmb πt+((ρ − δm)δπe + δπmδme)b ξt.
Collecting terms, we end up with the following expression
b Rt =ρπb πt + ρyb yt + ρξb ξt,
where ρπ =( −(σ − 1) + σµπ)δm and ρy = µyδm,
ρξ =( −(σ − 1) + σµπ)((ρ − δm)δπe + δπmδme)+µyδmeρ + µξρ,
where we used the money demand condition b mt = b yt. Hence, a money growth policy b µt =
µπb πt+µyb yt+µξb ξt, can implement a sequence of interest rates satisfying an endogenous target
rule b Rt = ρπb πt + ρyb yt, if its responds to current shocks by choosing µξ such that ρξ =0 .T o
examine the existence and the uniqueness of such a value for µξ we have to take into account
that the solution coeﬃcients are functions of the policy rule parameter. We know from (31)-
(32) that δm and δπm = (1−µy)δm−1
µπ−1 are independent of µξ. In contrast, δπe and δme depend
on the latter. Combining (33)-(34) reveals that δπe and, therefore, δme =
(µπ−1)δπe+µξ
1−µy are
linear in µξ :
δπe = −








27Alternatively, one can derive all coeﬃcients of the fundamental solution (30), determine the equilibrium
sequences of real balances and of inﬂation, and derive with (13)-(15) the equilibrium solution of the nominal
interest rate, which takes the form e Rt = δRm e mt−1 + δRee ξt. With the latter and the solutions for inﬂation
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growth policy there is a unique value µ∗
ξ, such that ρξ is equal to zero if the central bank
sets µξ = µ∗
ξ. Then, the central bank implements an equilibrium sequence of interest rates
satisfying b Rt = ρπb πt + ρyb yt. ¥
2.3 Proof of proposition 3
Consider that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate in a backward-looking way
b Rt = ρπb πt + ρlyb yt−1.U s i n g t h a tb mt = b yt, we can write the sticky price model (13)-(15)
in terms of inﬂation, real balances, and the nominal interest rate. Given that the model
now features a predetermined endogenous state variable, b mt−1, the fundamental solutions
under the money growth policy and the backward-looking interest rate rule take the same
form. To assess the equivalence between both types of rules, we use the equilibrium condition
b Rt = σEt b mt+1−σb mt+Etb πt+1,a n dr e w r i t ei ta sb Rt = σEtb µt+1−Etσb πt+1+Etb πt+1.Am o n e y
supply policy (16) then implies
Rt = σEt
³
µπb πt+1 + µy b mt+1 + µξb ξt+1
´
− (σ − 1)Etb πt+1.
Now suppose that shocks are not autocorrelated, ρ =0 . Using the fundamental solution (30),
we then get b Rt =
¡



















This equilibrium relation under a money supply policy already takes the form of the backward-
looking interest rate rule. In order get an expression that (mainly) consists of structural pa-
rameters, we further use that δπm = (1−µy)δm−1
µπ−1 and δme =
(µπ−1)δπe
1−µy . Then, the terms ρly =
(σµπδπm+σµyδm−(σ − 1)δπm)(δm− δme
δπe δπm) and ρπ =( σµπδπm+σµyδm−(σ − 1)δπm)δme
δπe
can be written as
ρly =




¢ and ρπ =
(σ − 1 − σµπ)(1− δm) − δmµy ¡
1 − µy
¢ ,






(1 − δm)(µπ − 1)σ +1
ρπ − δm
,
which give the conditions for a money supply b µt = µπb πt + µyb yt and the backward-looking
interest rate rule to implement the same fundamental solution. ¥
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In order to assess the conditions for stability under the backward-looking interest rate rule
b Rt = ρπb πt + ρlyb yt−1, we examine the characteristic polynomial which is given by
K(X)=X3 − X2σ + ω + σβ − σχρπ
σβ
+ X






Evidently, when the central bank does not react to lagged output, ρly =0 , then one root
is given by X =0 , which is assigned to the predetermined variable. Hence, the latter is
irrelevant for the equilibrium sequences. If ρly > 0, we know that K(0) = 1
σβρly > 0,
which implies that there are either three or one negative roots. In order to exhibit a stable
and positive root, K h a st ob en e g a t i v ea tX =1 .G i v e n t h a t K(1) = −[(1 − ρπ)ω +




]σ−1β−1, we can conclude that there is a stable root if ρπ < 1+
(β+χ−1)
ω ρly. Since there is at least one negative root, we further know that there cannot
be another positive and stable root.
3 Appendix to the money-in-the-utility-function speciﬁcation
3.1 Proof of lemma 4
To derive the conditions for stable and non-oscillatory equilibrium sequences in the money-
in-the-utility function model under a state contingent money growth policy (16), we replace
the nominal interest rate with the money demand condition, 1
R−1 b Rt = σb yt − σm b mt,i nt h e
consumption Euler equation to give Rσb yt = σEtb yt+1 +( R − 1)σm b mt + Etb πt+1. Together















































which exhibits the following characteristic polynomial













Given that Q(0) = −R/β < −1, we know that the product of the eigenvalues is strictly
positive and larger than one. Thus, there exists at least one unstable root, and either three
or one positive root. Further, the value of Q(1) is given by Q(1) =
(R−1)σm
βσ (ω(1 − µπ) −
(1 − β)µy). The existence of a stable root lying between zero and one, necessarily requires
Q(1) > 0, and therefore µπ +
1−β
ω µy < 1. Then, there is no other stable and positive root of
Q(X). Yet, Q(X) might exhibit a negative stable eigenvalue, which requires Q(−1) > 0. ¥
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To characterize the equilibrium behavior of the nominal interest rates under a state contingent
m o n e yg r o w t hp o l i c yb µt = b mt + b πt − b mt−1 = µπb πt +µyb yt +µξb ξt +µlξb ξt−2 in a money-in-the-
utility function framework, we proceed as in the benchmark model (see appendix 2.2). Using
the consumption Euler equation, money demand σmb mt + 1
R−1
b Rt = σb yt,a n db yt = b ct,w eg e t
σmEtb µt+1 =( σm − 1)Etb πt+1 − 1
R−1Et b Rt+1 + R
R−1







Et b Rt+1 =( σmµπ − (σm − 1))Etb πt+1+µyσmEtb yt+1+µξσmρb ξt+µlξσmb ξt−1.
Now use that the fundamental solution under a money growth policy implies Et b Rt+1 =
δm b Rt +( ( ρ − δm)δRe + δRmδme)b ξt. Thus, the current nominal interest rate is characterized




















By combining these two expressions, we can write




















((ρ − δm)δRe + δRmδme)
¶
b ξt − µlξσmb ξt−1
¸
.
where Γ = R−1
R−δm. Further using that Etb πt+1 = δmb πt +( ( ρ − δm)δπe + δπmδme)b ξt, Etb yt+1 =
δmb yt+((ρ − δm)δye + δymδme)b ξt,a n db Rt = δm b Rt−1+δReb ξt+(δRmδme−δmδRe)b ξt−1,w ec a n
rewrite (35) as in form of a backward-looking interest rate relation
b Rt = ρR b Rt−1 − [σm (µπ − 1) + 1]
¡
R − 1
¢ ρR − δm
R − δm
b πt − µyσm
¡
R − 1


















R−δm (σmµπ − (σm − 1))((ρ − δm)δπe + δπmδme)
+
ρR−δm

















Now, suppose that there exists a value µ∗
ξ and a value µ∗
lξ such that the terms in the curly
brackets equal zero if the central bank sets µξ = µ∗
ξ and µlξ = µ∗
lξ.T h e n ,w ee n du pw i t ha n
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b Rt = ρR b Rt−1 + ρπb πt + ρyb yt,
where ρπ = −[σm (µπ − 1) + 1]Γ(ρR − δm) and ρy = −µyσmΓ(ρR − δm),
Following the line of arguments for the corresponding problem in appendix 2.2, we further
know that there exist unique values for µ∗
ξ and for µ∗
lξ, respectively, since all solution coeﬃ-
cients in the curly brackets in (36) are either independent of µ∗
ξ and µ∗
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